Sellars and ultimate reality
DACH, S. Sellars and ultimate reality. Kent, Ohio, USA, 2015.
|Anglický název:||Sellars and ultimate reality|
|Autoři:||Mgr. Stefanie Dach|
|Abstrakt EN:||Although W. Sellars’s system is designed with care, many commentators have pointed to a tension manifest in it. The aim of my paper is to shift the focus of the discussions on how to attenuate it from language-world relations to problems often regarded as side issues. I focus on the following question: Given that Sellars accepts our “situatedness” in contingent systems of norms and practices and given that he understands these as crucial for what we take to be true and real, how can he sustain the idea of ultimate reality or an ultimate conceptual scheme that captures it? First, I examine and criticize W. de Vries’ attempt to introduce the concept of “practical reality” in order to cope with the tensions mentioned. DeVries relies on the notion of the “objects of a conceptual framework”. I show this way of approaching the issue to be out of line with Sellars’s position and to lead us into unnecessary puzzlement. It merges talk about the world and talk about concepts in a way that can hinder us from understanding Sellars. On the basis of this criticism, I offer further considerations on how to answer our central question, concentrating on three main points: how to understand Sellars’s philosophical task, the role of picturing and that of practical thought. Sellars’ work is primarily concerned with elucidating or suggesting concepts, which also includes a workable concept of “ultimate reality” suited to our situation with its specific problems. The universal dimension needed for a concept of ultimate reality might be gained by understanding the ultimate conceptual framework to help us, in Sellars’s words, maximize the welfare of a universal community. But the pursuit of epistemic ends, which supposedly leads to ever better linguistic pictures of the world, seems neither to be a necessary means to achieve communal welfare from our point of view, nor does it seem to be necessarily implied by the concept of communal welfare.|