Wittgenstein on Probability
SCHUSTER, R. Wittgenstein on Probability. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Rakousko, 2016.
|Anglický název:||Wittgenstein on Probability|
|Autoři:||Mgr. Radek Schuster Ph.D.|
|Abstrakt EN:||It may be expected that after Wittgenstein had abandoned the doctrine of elementary proposition his thinking about probability moved from the logical to the epistemological aspect. However, in my talk, I show (1.) that the logical definition of probability has also its constitutive epistemological basis, namely in our knowledge of hypothetically assumed laws of nature, and (2.) that Wittgenstein’s later analyses of observed relative frequencies still appeal to a priori logical calculus. Furthermore I argue (3.) that the seemingly indecisive results of Wittgenstein’s analyses prove that we use judgements of probability because we are reluctant to switch over from logic to epistemology and vice versa by means of induction.|